We estimate DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) technical efficiency scores for nearly five thousand Brazilian municipalities using a recently proposed method that combines bootstrap and jackknife resampling to eliminate the influence of outliers and possible measurement and recording errors in the data. We use both the constant and variable returns to scale variants of the DEA method. After computing the efficiency scores, we use econometric methods to investigate the determinants of those scores. The results reveal that: (a) the level of computer usage (a proxy for administrative capability) tends to have a positive and highly significant impact on efficiency; such gains seem to be greater for the most inefficient municipalities, thus indicating the existence of diminishing marginal benefits; (b) the urbanization rate is also shown to be positively correlated with the efficiency measures; (c) excess spending due to royalty revenues and economies of scale seem to explain why efficiency scores increase with the size of the municipality; (d) municipalities which take part in the Alvorada Program (a federal program for low income communities) tend to display higher efficiency scores than those they would have achieved had they not been included in the project. Additionally, the results show that the more power awarded to municipal councils, the better the effectiveness in resource utilization as measured by efficiency indices. This is because such councils tend to increase the transparency of the budgeting process, hence reducing corruption and the misuse of local funds.
Introduction
Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos de Souza (1999a,b) used nonparametric techniques, DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) and FDH (Free Disposal Hull) , to measure the level of technical efficiency of Brazilian municipalities. Their work allowed to evaluate the performance of the Brazilian cities and provided instruments that can be used for evaluating local governments. Yet, we should emphasize the exploratory nature of those works. Besides the data limitations, the computed indicators should be carefully used, as the inefficiencies found are not explained only by managerial incompetence or by the inexistence of satisfactory incentive schemes to assure an adequate functioning of the communities. Due to the deterministic nature of nonparametric models, they consider that all the observations are feasible with probability one. Inefficiencies due to the presence of atypical observations, measurement errors, omitted variables, and other statistical discrepancies are not taken into account. Notice that these approaches do not specify a particular form for the production frontier. Consequently, there is no formal description of the uncertainty and noise associated with the observed DMUs (Decision Making Units).
Additionally, data heterogeneity in DEA methods may aggravate this problem and lead to substantial underestimation of efficiency scores since the frontier is achieved by a small number of municipalities. This problem should not be overlooked, especially when the dataset is both huge and diverse, as is the case of the data on Brazilian municipalities. Here, the size and heterogeneity of the sample makes it virtually impossible to manually detect outliers and/or measurement errors, thus requiring the use of an automated approach. Therefore, to make efficiency scores credible it is necessary to use an adequate procedure to correct those indices for outliers. Only then, one may hope to obtain reliable estimates, which could be useful for policymakers.
The inefficiencies may also be due to the existence of exogenous factors that are out of the control of the municipalities, such as natural and climatic conditions, political factors, demographic and socioeconomic features, etc., which have not been taken into account in the preceding nonparametric analysis. The importance of those aspects has been pointed out by several authors, who used different techniques to separate out the influence of those factors from the ones associated with productive efficiency and thus get a "pure" measure of technical efficiency (see Lovell et al. (1994) , Kalirajan (1990) , McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) and Yu (1998) ). The key issue here is to identify the conditioning factors underlying the efficiency scores.
In this paper we estimate efficiency indices for Brazilian municipalities by using bootstrap and jackknife resampling in a combined fashion to reduce the influence of outliers and possible errors in the dataset. Both the constant and variable returns to scale variants of the DEA method are considered. After computing the efficiency scores we use econometric methods (including quantile regression) to investigate the determinants of the efficiency scores.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to compute the outliers-corrected DEA efficiency scores. Section 3 briefly describes the data and the choice of the indicators used as proxies for the supply of local public services. Section 4 discusses the nonparametric efficiency estimates obtained. Section 5 presents the econometric results of the analysis of the conditional factors underlying those scores. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
Data Envelopment Analysis Measures of Technical Efficiency
Nonparametric deterministic approaches to efficiency measurements are characterized by the use of very weak assumptions concerning the production technology. Except for the usual regularity axioms, such as the boundedness and closedness of the technology, those methods rely on very simple assumptions, such as convexity and strong free disposability in inputs and outputs. In particular, this is true for linear programming based techniques, known as DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis). 
Data envelopment analysis reference technology
For each decision making unit (DMU), technology transforms nonnegative inputs x k = (x k1 , ..., x kN ) ∈ R N + into nonnegative outputs y k = (y k1 , ..., y kM ) ∈ R M + . For input-based measures of technical efficiency technology is represented by its production possibility set T = {(x, y) : x can produce y}, the set of all feasible input-output vectors.
The input correspondence for the DEA reference technology, characterized by constant returns to scale (C) and strong disposability of inputs (S), defines a piecewise linear technology constructed on the basis of observed input-output combinations:
L (y|C, S) = x : y ≤ zM, zN ≤ x, z ∈ R
The k x m matrix M contains the m observed outputs of each of the k observations in the dataset, N is the kxn matrix of observed inputs and z is the 1 x k vector of intensity parameters. 2 For each activity, the technical efficiency on inputs, F i , may be defined, as:
This radial efficiency measure always lies between zero and one. The efficient production on the isoquant has unit efficiency score. Thus, 1 − θ represents the proportion in which the inputs could be reduced without changing production. By using the technology specified in (1), technical efficiency (input-oriented) for the municipality k may be computed as the solution of the following linear program:
subject to:
This version of the DEA methodology -known as the CCR model (Charnes et al., 1978) -implies strong restrictions concerning the production set, in particular constant returns to scale. This assumption can be easily relaxed by modifying the restrictions on the intensity vector z. For example, Färe et al. (1985 Färe et al. ( , 1994 have extended this technique to include the existence of non-increasing returns to scale by adding the following restriction to (1):
Here, the sum of the intensity variables cannot exceed unity, implying that the different activities can be contracted but cannot be expanded to infinity. In the case of variable returns to scale -the BCC - Banker et al. (1984) model -activities cannot be expanded radially without limits, nor contracted to the origin. We have, thus, increasing returns for low levels of production and decreasing returns for higher levels. It is well known that the efficiency indices associated with this technology -henceforth called DEA-BCC -are obtained by imposing equality on restriction (4).
Leverage and the "jackstrap" procedure
As previously mentioned, one of the main drawbacks of DEA is that the resulting efficiency scores are rather sensitive to the presence of DMUs that perform extremely well (the so called outliers), which may stem from outstanding practice or may simply be the result of errors in the data. In either case, the results for the remaining DMUs become shifted towards lower efficiency levels, the efficiency frequency distribution becomes highly asymmetric, and the overall efficiency scale becomes nonlinear. Several authors have considered this effect. Wilson (1993 Wilson ( , 1995 introduced descriptive methods to detect influential observations in nonparametric efficiency calculations. Triantis (1992, 1995) proposed the fuzzy clustering strategy and high breakdown procedures to deal with outliers and leverage points. The fuzzy clustering strategy merges the traditional data envelopment analysis framework with concepts developed in fuzzy parametric programming, while the high breakdown robust method is used in conjunction with robust distance measures to detect outliers and leverage points. Within the super-efficiency model (Andersen and Petersen, 1993) , the efficient unit can receive a score greater than one, through the unit's exclusion from the column being scored in the linear program. Although this method was conceived to rank efficient units, its use was extended to include outlier detection. More recent developments of this important issue include the order-m frontiers (Simar, 2003 , Cazals et al., 2002 and the Robust Efficiency Frontier Post, 1999, Cherchye et al., 2000) . The order-m approach, based on the concept of expected minimum input function (or maximal output function), yields frontiers of varying degrees of robustness. It was applied to the FDH estimator and thus shares its statistical properties. Robust Efficiency Measurement (REM) decomposes the original DEA set into different nested reference sets and efficiency is thus measured relative to these sets. Both the order-m frontiers and the REM measurements allow for statistical inference while keeping its nonparametric nature.
Yet, the proposed approaches are heavily dependent on manual inspection of data, which becomes virtually impossible for large datasets, like the one in use here. To tackle this issue, we shall use a method recently proposed by Stosic and Sampaio de Souza (2003) , which is based on a combination of bootstrap and jackknife resampling schemes, for automatic detection of outliers. This approach is based on the concept of leverage, that is, the effect produced on the outcome of DEA efficiencies of all the other DMUs when the observed DMU is removed from the dataset (see Cribari-Neto and Zarkos (2004) ). The leverage measure is calculated for each DMU, and it is then used to detect outliers and errors in the dataset, and to eliminate them in an automated fashion, or to just reduce their influence. The underlying idea is that outliers are expected to display leverage much above the mean leverage, and hence should be selected with lower probability than the other DMUs when resampling is performed.
The leverage of a single observed DMU might be understood as the quantity that measures the impact of the removal of the DMU from the dataset on the efficiency scores of all the other DMUs. Formally, it may be defined as the standard deviation of the efficiency measures before and after that removal. The most straightforward possibility is to use jackknife resampling as follows. One first applies DEA to each of the DMUs using the unaltered, original dataset to obtain the set of efficiencies {θ k |k = 1, . . . , K}. Then, one by one, each DMU is successively removed from the dataset, and each time the set of efficiencies {θ * kj |k = 1, . . . , K : k = j} is recalculated, where j = 1, . . . , K indexes the reBrazilian Review of Econometrics 25(2) November 2005 moved DMU. The leverage of the j-th DMU may then be defined as
While rather straightforward, this approach is extremely computationally intensive, and may prove unfeasible for very large datasets. More precisely, removing each of the K DMUs from the dataset and then performing (K − 1) DEA calculations requires solving K(K − 1) linear programming problems, which may become prohibitively expensive for large K. We therefore proposed a more efficient stochastic procedure, which combines bootstrap resampling with the above jackknife scheme as follows:
1. Randomly select a subset of L DMUs (typically 10% of K) and perform the above procedure to obtain subset leveragesl k1 , where the index k takes on L (randomly selected) values from the set {1, . . . , K}.
2. Repeat the above step B times, accumulating the subset leverage informatioñ ℓ kb for all randomly selected DMUs (for B large enough, each DMU should be selected roughly n k ≈ BL|K times).
3. Calculate mean leverage for each DMU as
and the global mean leverage asl
This completes the first phase of the proposed approach. In the second phase, one can either use the leverage measures to detect and simply eliminate outliers from the dataset, or one can implement a bootstrap method to produce confidence intervals and bias information, using leverage information to reduce the probability of selecting the identified outliers in the stochastic resampling process. The point here is how leverage information can be used to identify potential outliers (and/or errors). More precisely, after ordering the DMUs according to their leverage values such thatl i ≥l j for i < j, a choice should be made as to what threshold leverage valuel 0 should be used to warn of potential influential DMUs. One possibility for making this choice is to systematically remove, one by one, the most influential DMUs (with the largest leverage), and compare the resulting successive empirical efficiency distributions. The effect of removal of the high leverage DMUs on the efficiency distributions may then be used to extract the threshold value. We may, for instance, apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K −S) to quantify the difference between the efficiency distributions before and after the removal of the m-th influential DMU. By plotting the results of the K − S test as a function of the number m of removed influential DMUs, one can then observe the point m 0 after which there is no more significant difference between the two groups, and choose for the corresponding leverage value for the threshold. This approach, however, is extremely computationally intensive, and may be difficult to implement for very large datasets. As an alternative, one may use the multiple of the global mean leveragel 0 = cl (as a rule of thumb, setting c = 2 or 3) for the threshold, or by taking into account the sample size K, one may use the product ℓ 0 =l log K. In this paper, we used a variant of this rule, the Heaviside step function, given by
In what follows, the threshold levell log K was chosen in order to take into account the sample size, so that, e.g., for K = 1000 a DMU with leverage greater than three times the global mean is rejected. Of course, as any cutoff level, this is somehow arbitrary, but it proved to be, by our experience, a quite robust rule. 
Data
The implementation of the methods presented above requires information on aggregate total costs and other relevant inputs, as well as information on the amount of public services available to the population of the municipalities (outputs). Initially, data for 5,264 Brazilian municipalities were collected. We excluded from the sample municipalities for which key information was missing; 620 observations were dropped since 493 of them had a recorded population of zero inhabitants and 127 others had no data on current expenditure. 4 The final dataset contained 4,796 municipalities. The data are for the year 2000.
Input and output indicators for the Brazilian municipalities
A list of inputs and outputs is provided in Table 1 , together with their respective sources, and the public service they are supposed to represent. The choice of the variables followed two criteria: relevance and data availability. Concerning the inputs used, aggregate total costs were computed as the value of municipal current spending. The other inputs used were the number of teachers (as a proxy for personnel inputs), the number of hospital and health centers, as they are the main providers of health services. The rate of infant mortality stands as an input because when health services are efficient, this indicator is expected to be as low as possible.
5
As for output measures, due to the impossibility of directly quantifying the supply of public services, they were approximated by a set of selected indicators, which are observable factors taken as proxies for the services supplied. Administrative, educational, health and housing conditions account for roughly 80% of the budget of the Brazilian municipalities. After a careful choice, nine output indicators were retained. Total resident population stands as a proxy for the various administrative tasks performed by the municipalities. This variable is also supposed to account for other services for which proxies are not available, eg. crime control provided by the communes. As crime incidence (and crime control) is mainly a phenomenon of relatively big cities, the inclusion of the population indirectly allows to take the provision of those services into account.
Regarding the educational variables, the variables used stand not only for the quantitative aspects of the schooling system, but are also supposed to account for some of its qualitative aspects. The motivation of choosing schooling variablesenrollment, attendance, promotion to the next grade and student in the proper grade -come from the fact that they are supposed to reflect the main problems of the education system in Brazil. Firstly, municipalities have to encourage students to enroll, as the law that compels students up to 14 years old to attend school is not enforced. After that, the students should stay in school and get promoted to the next grade, as the incidence of dropout and repetition rates are very high in Brazil. Finally, due to those higher repetition rates, many students are not in an age-appropriate grade level, thus creating a distortion on the learning process. 
Nonparametric Efficiency Estimates
Figures 1 and 2 display the histograms of the efficiency measures computed for the Brazilian municipalities in the sample, by using the CCR and BCC methods, as well as nonparametric kernel estimates (solid line) of the densities of the efficiency scores (using Gaussian kernels). The scores are restricted to the standard interval, i.e., they assume values between zero and one. Note that the distribution of those measures is approximately symmetric, with a high concentration around the average.
We shall first discuss the CCR results. The mean of all scores is 0.5222, the median is 0.5031, and the standard deviation is 0.1757; the first and the third quartiles are 0.3952 and 0.6257, respectively. The symmetry of the distribution is shown by the closeness between the mean and the median. The municipality with the lowest score (0.0946) is São Félix do Coribe, located in the state of Bahia. Only 85 municipalities form the efficiency frontier. Concerning the DEA-BCC estimates (variable returns to scale), the dataset includes 4,755 municipalities. Input and output variables are the same ones used in the CCR model. Here the mean and median scores are 0.5249 and 0.5073, respectively, and the minimum and maximum scores are 0.0774 and 1. The standard deviation is 0.1652 and the first and third quartiles are, respectively, 0.4093 and 0.6198. Only 79 municipalities (1.66% of all observations) are on the frontier. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the computed efficiency scores, for each Brazilian region. For the CCR estimates, all regions have efficient units. Indeed, out of the 85 units classified as efficient, 6 are in the North, 19 are in the Northeast, 4 are in the Midwest, and 46 are in the Southeast (from those, 32 are located in the state of São Paulo). Thus, more than half of the efficient municipalities are located in the Southeast region, and this region also has the highest average efficiency score, although it also displays the second smallest minimum score. For the BCC variant, the geographical distribution of the 79 efficient municipalities is the following: 6 are located in the North region, 21 are found in the Northeast region, 4 are situated in the Midwest, 38 are in the Southeast region, and 10 belong to the South region. The state of São Paulo alone has 26 efficient units, nearly one third of the total number of efficient municipalities.
Conditional Factors Affecting the Computed Efficiency Scores: An Econometric Analysis
We shall now turn to the estimation of regression models that aim at identifying the factors that explain the variability of the computed efficiency scores for Brazilian municipalities. The dependent variable (EFIC) is the DEA efficiency measure. The explanatory variables describe relevant characteristics of the municipalities considered. Note that the estimated coefficients are conditional on the values obtained by the DEA scores and thus they do not take into account the uncertainty associated with those scores. 
The econometric model
Let n be the number of municipalities, θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ′ the vector of efficiency scores, X a matrix of dimension n × p, containing the municipality characteristics, β a p-dimensional vector of unknown parameters and u an n-dimensional vector of random errors. We can write a regression model as
Here, x t denotes the p-dimensional vector of the characteristics of the t-th municipality. As we do not have a priori information about the functional form of f , its is common practice to assume linearity:
Since the efficiency scores are restricted to assume values within the standard unit interval (0 < θ ≤ 1), the ordinary least squared (OLS) estimator of the vector of regression parameters will be inconsistent in the sense that it will not converge on probability to the true unknown parameter. However, it has been shown in the literature that the use of log(θ) as dependent variable leads to consistent and unbiased OLS estimates if the computed scores only assume strictly positive values.
Furthermore, when the dependent variable is censored, as is the case with our scores, the OLS estimator of the linear regression parameters will not be consistent and such inconsistency worsens with the proportion of censored observations in the sample. A proof of this result, under some regularity conditions, is given in Greene (1981) . This result implies that the problem of inconsistency will not be serious when the number of censored observations is small.
Censored observations may be appropriately tackled using the Tobit model. In this model, parameters are usually estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) under the assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity. It is noteworthy that the absence of normality as well as the presence of heteroskedasticity will lead to inconsistent parameter estimates.
Another important aspect of modeling in classical or Tobit regression, in our particular case, is the possibility of existence of spatial effects due to the existence of some functional relationship between the municipal efficiency structures in two distinct points in space. The smaller the area where those points are located, the higher the probability of geographical correlation. Anselin (1988) proposed the following model to explicitly consider the spatial dependency:
(I − ρW ) θ = Xβ + e ⇒ θ = ρW θ + Xβ + e, with e = λW e + u where I is the identity matrix and W is an n × n matrix that controls for the existence of neighborhood effects. Here, the parameter ρ measures the spatial correlation that, if different from zero, implies that the computed efficiency score of a given municipality is directly affected by the scores of its neighbors. The parameter λ captures the spatial correlation between the errors and u is a new error term.
7 As the specified model is the semi-log, we used lnθ as the dependent variable:
Here we will use two forms for the W matrix: first, the element (i, j) from W will be one if municipalities i and j are neighbors and zero otherwise, neighborhood being defined as geographical distance that does not exceed 50 kilometers; secondly, the element (i, j) from W will be equal to the distance between municipalities i and j divided by the maximum distance encountered; hence, we have a measure between zero and one for all pairs of localities and not only a binary measure of neighborhood.
As the municipalities differ significantly in various aspects, it is reasonable to expect that their associated regression errors also display different variances. Thus, when estimating the parameters we should take into account the existence of heteroskedasticity.
In what follows, we shall use the linear regression model instead of the Tobit model. The reasons for that choice are as follows.
1. Contrary to the Tobit model, estimation in the linear model does not require the assumption of normality; this assumption can be quite restrictive since we have no prior information about the distribution of the data. As pointed out by a referee, it is possible to define the Tobit model using nonnormal distributions. However, the main shortcoming remains: distributional misspecification will result in unreliable inference.
2. The OLS estimator in the linear regression model is unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normal even under neglected heteroskedasticity of unknown form; the same does not hold for the ML estimator in the Tobit model.
3. It is possible to obtain an estimate for the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of β that is consistent under both homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity of unknown form (see below); hence, one can perform hypothesis tests that are asymptotically valid regardless of the structure of the error variances and of the error distribution. These convenient properties do not hold in the Tobit framework.
4. The proportion of censored observations in the sample is small (around 1.8%).
As for the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of the parameter β (point 3 above), different estimators can be found in the literature. White (1980) proposed a consistent estimator, which is commonly used in empirical work and is known as HC0. This estimator is given by
whereΩ is an n×n diagonal matrix containing, in its main diagonal, the squares of the OLS residuals. Monte Carlo simulations have shown that this estimator tends to lead to associated tests that are considerably liberal, in the sense that their true size is typically substantially greater than the selected significance level (see Cribari-Neto (2004) , Long and Ervin (2000) , and MacKinnon and White (1985) ).
Other covariance matrix estimators are available. The HC3 estimator, for instance, is obtained by defining the t-th diagonal element ofΩ not asû
2 , where h t is the t-th diagonal element of the "hat matrix", H = X(X ′ X) −1 . Since h t is a measure of the degree of leverage associated with observation t, this estimator includes a correction for the different levels of leverage of the different observations. Simulation results have shown that this estimator leads to more precise inferences than the White estimator (HC0) and several of its other variants (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Long and Ervin (2000) ).
Cribari-Neto (2004) proposed the HC4 estimator, where the square of the t-th residual inΩ is divided by (1 − h t ) δt , with δ t = min(4, nh t /p). Numerical results show that quasi-t tests whose statistics use this estimator typically display smaller size distortions relative to alternative tests. Indeed, those results show that the performance of the test based on HC4 is similar to that of a test based on a double bootstrap resampling scheme, the latter being highly computationally intensive.
Finally, this typical two-step procedure used to explain efficiency is flawed, as the efficiency scores may be seriously correlated in an unknown way. This is a known problem. Yet, only a few studies recognized this problem in the secondstage regression (see for instance Hirschberg and Lloyd (2002) , Xue and Harker (2002) ). In such cases, the proposed correction is to apply bootstrap techniques in order to correct the estimates and improve inference. Yet, this is still a frontier line of research. There is not even agreement on how to bootstrap the estimates. The above mentioned studies used a naive bootstrap proposed by Ferrier and Hirschberg (1997) , but this method has been shown to be inconsistent (Simar and Wilson, 2000) . Further developments of this approach (Simar, 2003) have shown that the bias is more severe when the Tobit model is used. Besides, the aforementioned procedures have so far used a controlled environment and have not yet been applied to huge databases such as ours. Nonetheless, we point out that any finite sample bias in the procedure we employed in the current paper is likely to vanish as the sample size grows, provided that the correlations decrease as the number of observations increases, as expected. The parameter estimates thus remain consistent and asymptotically unbiased. Note that our sample size is large enough for the asymptotics to kick in, and as a result any bias left will be of second order.
Estimation results: the linear model
The dependent variables correspond to the natural logarithms of the efficiency scores for 4,755 Brazilian municipalities computed using the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC variants. In the first formulation we have tried to include most of the municipalities' characteristics as covariates, except for those that were almost certainly collinear. Some of these variables are of the dummy type, i.e., they equal one when the associated characteristic is present, and zero otherwise. The second model was estimated considering only the regressors that proved to be statistically significant.
In both models, the results were obtained using the linear regression model, the parameters were estimated by ordinary least squares and their standard errors were computed using the HC3 estimator. Table 3 presents the explanatory variables as well as the econometric results for the two models for both DEA measures. In what follows, the results are grouped according to the identified effects.
• Spatial and localization effects: The results in Table 3 suggest the relevance of the neighborhood effect in the spatial distribution of the efficiency scores. Indeed, in all four models considered, we found positive spatial correlation, thus indicating that higher efficiency levels tend to spread out, at least, partially, to the surrounding localities, in some sort of "demonstration effect". As for the location aspects, there is a clear efficiency premium for state capitals, since those cities tend to present higher scores relative to other localities with similar characteristics. The same effect was not found for the metropolitan areas, hence indicating that this somehow "privileged" location does not influence the computed efficiency. Finally, as expected, the municipalities located in the drought areas (Polígono da Seca) are likely to be less efficient than their counterparts in more clement areas, thus showing that those municipalities, assailed by adverse climatic conditions, have more difficulty providing the required public services to their population.
• Socio-economic impacts: The income level and the poverty proxy (variables E3 and E4, respectively) were statistically significant only when the efficiency scores were estimated using the DEA-BCC variant; surprisingly, for both variables, the sign of the effects were reversed. Hence, the fact that a municipality is relatively impoverished does not imply per se poor resource management. In spite of their low-income population, those communities can rationally use their resources, thus overcoming their disadvantaged background. Furthermore, among the very poor municipalities, those taking part in the Alvorada Program, when we control for other factors, tend to be more efficient; probably, the monitoring required by this program contributes to increasing the efficient use of scarce resources, thus signaling that a better management could be a by-product of the Alvorada Program.
Finally, the municipalities that receive substantial royalty revenues (on oil and water) tend to be less efficient than they would be otherwise; although their per capita spending levels are very high, suggesting that they adjust expenses to their extra revenues, the increased expenditures are not translated into more and better public services, thus explaining why those "over-financed" communes have low efficiency scores. Rather than encouraging better resource allocation, the additional royalty revenues seem instead to contribute to a relaxation of fiscal constraints and to increased inefficiency. In short, our results clearly show that there is no direct relationship between higher revenues (public and/or private) and better quality of life, as measured by the access to public services. • Economies of scale indicators: The scale variables included in the analysis were relevant to explain efficiency in all models we estimated. Both population density and urbanization rate exert strong positive effects on efficiency scores, thus corroborating previous insights suggested by the nonparametric analysis described in Section 3. Indeed, the fact that cities with very low density rates tend to be less efficient is most likely due to the presence of local increasing returns to scale prevalent among small municipalities. The scattered population in those cities tends to raise the average costs of public services, thus preventing them from exploiting the economies of scale that characterize the production of those services, and so they fail to optimally use their resources. 8 On the other hand, higher density rates decrease the costs of the above-mentioned services, and hence contribute to increasing efficiency. The strong effect of the urbanization rate on efficiency measures (its p-value is smaller than 2 × 10 −16 ) also captures the scale effect, as the average costs of local public services in the least inhabited rural areas tend to be higher. Moreover, this variable may capture the fact that human and material administration resources are scarcer in rural areas, thus reducing the efficiency indices for less urbanized communities.
• . Only the coefficients for PMDB and PDT were significant at a 5% level, thus indicating that municipalities run by a mayor coming from these parties tend to be less efficient. The result holds for all models we considered, including the ones using quantile regression, but it deserves a more careful analysis.
• Management variables: As for the management variables, surprisingly, we found an inverse relationship between the efficiency scores and the degree to which the real estate register is up-to-date; such a relation is significant in all estimated models. This variable is a proxy for a good fiscal administration; yet, our results consistently suggest that even if a mayor is eager to maintain the tax revenues, this does not prevent him/her from neglecting the way they are spent. On the other hand, the inverse relationship between efficiency and participation in intermunicipal consortia may be due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, only the municipalities which suffer the most from the lack of adequate scale of public service production, thus being likely to present low efficiency scores, have an incentive to join those consortia in an attempt to reduce average costs. There is also a strong positive relationship between the efficiency scores and the level of computer utilization (p-value: 3.36 × 10 −13 ); such a relationship was expected; indeed, as computer utilization eases administrative tasks, it is a powerful tool for management, thus being indicative of a "superior" and more effective decision-making process. Finally, in all estimated models, we found that the more power yielded to municipal councils, the better the effectiveness in resource utilization as measured by efficiency indices. This was expected, since those councils tend to increase the transparency of the budgeting process, hence contributing to more effective control over corruption and over the misuse of local funds.
We note that Koenker's (1981) homoskedasticity test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity, thus justifying the utilization of robust standard errors. Indeed, the p-value of the test is 7.971 × 10 −12 , thus indicating strong evidence against the assumption of constant conditional variances.
Quantile regression estimates
To complement the econometric analysis carried out in the previous subsection, we shall proceed to a more detailed investigation using quantile regression methods, as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) . Just as classical linear regression allows one to estimate models for conditional mean functions, quantile regression methods offer a mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median function, and also for other conditional quantile functions. This allows us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on the efficiency scores across different efficiency classes. The basic idea is to estimate the τ -th quantile of efficiency conditional on the different explanatory variables, assuming that this quantile may be expressed as a linear predictor based on these variables. To that end, we considered the following conditional quantiles: 0.10 (percentile 10%), 0.25 (lower quartile), 0.50 (median), 0.75 (upper quartile) and 0.90 (percentile 90%). In each case, we kept the explanatory variables that proved to be statistically significant. The results are shown in Tables 4 (DEA-CCR) and 5 (DEA-BCC).
At the outset, notice that the geographic effect is present in all conditional quantiles analyzed; however, this influence is much stronger on the more inefficient municipalities. Additionally, note also that the capital effect is significant at all quantiles for DEA-BBC and from the lower quartile up to the third quartile, inclusive, for DEA-CCR. That is, there is a premium of efficiency, other things equal, for capitals.
Also, for municipalities in the lowest efficiency class, their location on the Drought Area (Polígono das Secas) is not important as far as the interest lies in explaining efficiency, thus suggesting that for such cities other sources of inefficiency predominate over their location. As for the impact of socio-economic factors on efficiency, the quantile regression analysis, using the BCC version, is much more clarifying than the previous ones. Indeed, for inefficient municipalities, it clearly shows that a higher proportion of the low-income population contributes to increasing efficiency scores, although this effect is rather small. The underlying reason is most likely the fact that those communities usually benefit from a number of social programs that are closely monitored; thus, with them comes a natural pressure for more rational resource utilization. Regarding the impact of average income on efficiency, the BCC results confirm our previous finding that it has a negative effect on efficiency. Finally, as for royalty revenues, the quantile regression estimates confirm our previous results, namely that receivers of substantial royalty revenues are less efficient. The new result here is the fact that this impact gets smaller as efficiency increases, being particularly damaging for highly inefficient units. This may indicate that they have no managerial capabilities to usefully handle the additional resources.
According to the quantile regression results, the influence of politics on efficiency is similar to what was previously found. Except for two parties, PDT and PMDB, the mayor's political affiliation has no impact on the efficiency scores. However, here, the estimated negative effects for those parties are not very significant; particularly, in the case of PDT, the negative effect is present only for the two lowest conditional quantiles (τ = 0.10 and τ = 0.25). Moreover, our results reveal that the benefits of increased computer utilization decrease as the level of efficiency increases. Indeed, the estimated coefficients corresponding to this variable for the conditional quantiles τ = 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 are 0.132, 0.126, 0.089 and 0.050, respectively, thus indicating the existence of diminishing marginal benefits for computer usage. Due to the widespread use of computer equipment in the highly efficient municipalities, computer use no longer constitutes a proxy for "superior" management. Contrary to the aggregate analysis, where the negative effect of the degree to which the real estate register is up-to-date on efficiency was clearly verified, in the quantile regression analysis this is only true for the most inefficient units.
On the other hand, we thought that the inverse relationship between efficiency and participation in intermunicipal consortia was caused by diseconomies of scale prevalent among inefficient municipalities. Yet, here the results show that, except for the two extreme quantiles (τ = 0.10 and τ = 0.90), this effect is quite widespread, thus suggesting that even relatively efficient municipalities cannot reach the optimum size for hospitals, for instance, and thus seek to join consortia in an attempt to reduce costs. Notice also that for the lowest classes of efficiency, the decision power of the municipal councils was less significant, thus meaning less control over the use of public resources, once more attesting that those cities lack managerial capabilities.
Last but not least, as in the preceding analysis, the scale variables -population density and urbanization rate -have positive and significant effect upon efficiency.
Alternative results using linear regression
To conclude our investigation, we shall examine a dataset where the municipalities do not have any neighborhood relationship. The new sample was constructed as follows: we selected the capitals and then randomly selected other units subject to the restriction that no two municipalities have a distance of less than 50 (fifty) kilometers between them in order to eliminate spatial correlation. The new dataset includes 768 municipalities whose average efficiency is 0.520, whose median efficiency is 0.500, the standard deviation is 0.1795, and the minimum efficiency is 0.0947. With the DEA-CCR variant, roughly 2% of the communities are fully efficient. As before, in the econometric analysis, we first fitted a model including most of the conditional variables (model 1) and later, in model 2, we only considered the ones that were significant in the first model. The results are displayed in Table 6 .
As a general remark, we notice that the main results using this new sample are quite similar to the ones obtained when the complete dataset was used. Yet, we observe a few noteworthy differences. First, population density, a variable that stands for economies of scale, is no longer statistically significant. Secondly, the variable that measures royalty revenues is not significant in this sample, in model 2, at the nominal level of 10%. In order to investigate this result, we have estimated quantile regressions for the following conditional quantiles: τ = 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90. The results show that the negative impact of royalty revenues on efficiency is statistically significant only for the upper quartile, τ = 0.75. This means that, for this sample, the results contradict the ones obtained when applying both the BCC and the CCR methods to the entire set. Recall that in both models, clearly, the negative impact of royalty revenues decreased with the efficiency level. Lastly, the impact of the mayor's party affiliation on efficiency changes a great deal as now neither PMDB nor PDT exerts negative influence on efficiency, as they appeared to do earlier. Rather, PPS now appears as the only political party to negatively affect efficiency.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we first estimated the DEA CCR and BCC technical efficiency scores for nearly five thousand Brazilian municipalities by applying a method that combines bootstrap and jackknife resampling to eliminate the effect of outliers and measurement errors in the data. The computed efficiency scores, as well as their ranks, proved to be very robust for both variants, thus increasing the credibility of the estimated frontiers. Since the estimated efficiency scores are affected by exogenous characteristics, which were not taken into account in our DEA calculations, we included those factors in the analysis. To that end, we used econometric methods (including quantile regression) to investigate how the excluded variables influence the computed scores. The econometric results proved to be very robust to the nonparametric efficiency variants used as dependent variable. The estimated coefficients were also very stable relative to variations in the econometric specifications, in the techniques used and in the sample.
As one would expect, the spatial effect appears to be statistically significant, and hence it should not be overlooked when analyzing municipal data. Also, there is an efficiency premium for capitals, which does not hold for other metropolitan areas. In addition, as expected, the communities located in the drought areas (Polígono das Secas) tend to be less efficient than their counterparts in more clement areas, hence showing that it is more difficult for these cities, which are assailed by adverse climatic conditions, to properly supply public services.
The scale variables (population density and urbanization rate) also play important roles in explaining the efficiency scores, thus supporting our previous insight that the recent proliferation of small municipalities in Brazil does not lead to an efficient usage of public resources. Their small sizes prevent them from benefiting from the economies of scale inherent to the production of public services and, as a consequence, they tend to operate with higher average costs, thus wasting resources.
As for the management variables, the inverse relationship between efficiency and participation in intermunicipal consortia may be due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, only the municipalities that operate on a scale much below the optimum, thus being likely to present low efficiency scores, have an incentive to join those consortia in an attempt to reduce average costs and increase efficiency. There is also a strong positive relationship between the efficiency scores and the level of computer utilization. Such a relationship was expected; since computer utilization eases administrative tasks, it is a powerful management tool and thus it can be viewed as an indicator of a "superior" and more effective decision-making process. The quantile regression estimates suggest that the less efficient the municipality, the higher the benefits derived from computer utilization. We detected an inverse relationship between the efficiency scores and the degree to which the real estate register is up-to-date. Additionally, we found that the more power yielded to municipal councils, the better the effectiveness of resource utilization as measured by the efficiency indices. This is rather predictable since those councils tend to increase the transparency of the budgeting process, hence contributing to better control over corruption and over the misuse of local funds.
Last but not least, the socio-economic variables, such as the mean income level and the poverty proxy, were significant only when the efficiency scores were estimated by means of the DEA-BCC variant; surprisingly, for both variables, the sign of the effects were reversed. Thus, our results imply that poor cities, by wisely using their resources, may overcome their initial environmental disadvantages. Furthermore, among the very poor municipalities, those participating in the Alvorada Program tend to be more efficient, hence indicating that a better management could be a by-product of this program. Finally, the municipalities that receive substantial royalty revenues tend to be less efficient, then suggesting that the extra revenues, rather than encouraging the optimal use of resources, seem instead to contribute to a relaxation of fiscal constraints and to increased inefficiency. The main conclusion here is that higher revenues -public and/or private -instead of promoting efficiency, as measured by access to public services -may lead to relaxed budget constraints and spendthrift behavior.
